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Introduction
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TransAsia Flight 235
• ATR 72-600 aircraft
• Uncommanded feather of
the right engine
• Captain reduced throttle of
the left engine and shut it
down
• No power at 1,500 feet
AGL, engine restart
attempts unsuccessful
• Uncontrolled stall and crash
• 43 fatalities
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Engine misidentification
• Turboprops: From 1985 to 1997, almost 50% of in-flight engine shutdowns
involved a shutdown of the working engine (Sallee & Gibbons, 1999)
• Turbofans: From 1958 to 1997, 29% of in-flight engine shutdowns involved a
shutdown of the working engine (Sallee & Gibbons, 1999)
• Twin-engine helicopters: 40% of interviewed pilots admitted moving the
throttle of a working engine in emergency in real life/simulator (Wildzunas et
al., 1999; as cited in Aviation Safety Council, 2016)
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Dangers of twin-engine propeller aircraft
operations
• Failed engine creates drag due to the windmilling propeller
• Asymmetric thrust follows, resulting in a significant yaw
• Climb performance loss of up to 80% (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2016)
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Identify-Verify-Feather
• Identify: “Dead leg – dead engine”
• Compensate for the yaw by applying rudder
• Dead leg (not pushing the rudder pedal) is on the side of dead (failed) engine

• Verify: Confirm correct identification
• Pull back the throttle of the identified engine
• Expect no change in the direction of flight and engine sound

• Feather the propeller of the failed engine
Source: (Gardner, Schiff, & Bringloe, 2011)
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Purpose of the study
• Current method is believed to be too resource-demanding
• An alternative method was proposed and tested

• The alternative method was based on the visual sensory channel
• Participants flew three flights with simulated engine failures
• Response times and accuracy of identification were measured and
compared between two groups (Traditional vs Alternative)
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Hypotheses
• H01: There is no difference in accuracy of engine identification
between participants using the traditional and the alternative method.
• H02: There is no difference in response time across the three flights
between participants using the traditional and the alternative method
• H03: There is no difference in average response time for all three
flights between participants using the traditional and the alternative
method
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Lit. Review
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Human Capabilities and Limitations
• Stress
• Stress can affect operator’s judgment and assessment of the situation
• Evidence that conflicts with expectations may be explained away or ignored
(Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009)

• Workload
• Increase in workload can impair performance (Casto & Casali, 2013) and lead
to problems with task prioritization (Morris & Leung, 2007)
• Pilot error can become the source of increased workload (Morris & Leung,
2007)
• Planning for the increase in workload helps avoid detriments to performance
(Andre & Heers, 1995)
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Human Capabilities and Limitations
• Attention
• Human brain can handle up to four tasks concurrently without decrease in
performance (Fisher, 1984; Julesz, 1981; James, 1980; as cited in Strayer &
Drews, 2007)
• Attention can be influenced by anxiety, making pilot’s gaze behavior more
chaotic (Allsop & Gray, 2014)
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Haptic vs Visual Sensory Channels
• 80% of information we perceive is visual (Geruschat & Smith, 2010)
• People are more likely to notice visual cues (Hecht & Reiner, 2008)
over haptic or auditory
• Information coming through the visual channel gets priority even if an
operator knows that it is less reliable than the haptic channel (Xu,
O’Keefe, Suzuki, & Franconeri, 2012)
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Method
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Materials and Apparatus
• X-Plane 11 flight simulation software
• Engine Status Panel
• Indicates which engine has failed based on the fuel flow value

• Training video
• Explained basic concepts and the method of identification of a failed engine

• Pre- and post-flight questionnaires
• Demographics
• Confidence in correct engine identification

• Three simulated takeoffs
• Flight 1: Left engine failure 30 sec after rotation
• Flight 2: Right engine failure 20 sec after rotation
• Flight 3: Right engine failure 45 sec after rotation
14

Procedure
• 50 student pilots who did not have multi-engine rating (MEL) and had not started
their training were sampled
• Students received $20 for participation

• Participants were assigned to two groups
• Traditional Group
• Alternative Group

• Participants watched a training video
• Participants flew a practice flight
• Engine failure was demonstrated
• Participants were given an opportunity to practice the procedure

• Participants performed three takeoffs
• Engine failure was simulated by failing fuel pumps on the corresponding engine
• Participants were asked to announce verbally which engine had failed and comment aloud
their actions after the failure
15

4
Results
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Results: Demographics
• 42 Males & 8 Females
• Mean age M = 20.22 years (SD = 2.67 years)
• Mode age 18 years
• Average flight experience M = 145.90 hours (SD = 75.45 hours)
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Result: Hypotheses testing
• H01: Difference in accuracy of identification between group
• All participants feathered the correct engine
• H01 retained

• H02: Difference in response time across flights and between groups
• 2x3 mixed ANOVA within-subject variable test was not significant
• H02 retained
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Result: Hypotheses testing
• H03: Difference in response time between groups
• 2x3 mixed ANOVA between-subjects variable was significant at
F(1,48) = 10.83, p = 0.002
• Alternative Group (M = 3.09 seconds, SD = 1.84 seconds) was faster at
identification than Traditional Group (M = 5.09 seconds, SD = 2.43 seconds)
• H03 rejected
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Result: Qualitative data
Participants’ assessment of identification of a failed engine
Do you feel that you identified a failed
engine correctly for each of the three
flights?
Traditional Group
Alternative Group

Do you feel that you identified a failed
engine in adequate amount of time during
each of the three flights?
Traditional Group
Alternative Group

Flight 1
Yes
No

Flight 2
Yes
No

Flight 3
Yes
No

25

0

25

0

23

2

25

0

25

0

25

0

Flight 1
Yes
No

Flight 2
Yes
No

Flight 3
Yes
No

23

2

24

1

24

1

24

1

24

1

25

0
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Results: Suggestions for improvement
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Discussion
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Discussion
• Alternative Group was significantly faster at identifying a failed
engine than Traditional Group
• Some Traditional Group participants reported using visual cues for
identification
• Alternative Group participants were generally more confident in
correct identification
• Alternative Group participants reported being generally less confused
in regard to which engine was failing
• Traditional Group: M = 2.28, SD = 1.27. Alternative Group: M = 1.84,
SD = 1.03.
23

Limitations
• The response time was reducing from Flight 1 to Flight 3 for Alternative
Group
• With more power, there could be a significant difference

• 8 participants (6 in Traditional Group and 2 in Alternative Group) moved
the wrong throttle initially, but feathered the correct engine propeller
•
•
•
•

Increased response time
Might have hastily moved the throttle
Possible confusion due to no experience in multi-engine aircraft
Observing participant actions could help avoiding the issue in future research

• Participant behavior was not consistent
• Did not retract landing gear
• Did not power up
24

Further research
• Perform similar experiment with multi-engine-rated pilots
• Determine how past experience affects the ability to use the new method for
identification
• Possibly make further changes to the method

• Identify engine parameters most indicative of the failure
• Fuel flow was used, but is not enough
• Several parameters might need to be used
• Examples: Fuel Flow + Exhaust Gas Temperature
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Suggestions
• Particular benefit to General Aviation
• Reason: Lack of sophisticated systems in GA aircraft
• Reduce risk of human error in emergency situations
• Engine Status Panel can be installed aside from other instruments (to avoid
clutter)
• Newly-built aircraft are equipped with glass cockpits, hence the panel can be
shown on a display
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Conclusion
• Currently recommended method of identification might be too
confusing and resource-demanding
• This is dangerous in case if an engine fails on takeoff (high-workload)

• Using a method based on the visual sensory channel requires less time
for identification of a failed engine
• A panel with a visual indicator is recommended to be installed in GA
aircraft to reduce the risk of engine misidentification
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